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The purpose of this paper Is to present, or more correctly — to
revive, a hypothesis regarding the causes of agricultural serfdom or
slaverv (used here Interchangeably). The hypothesis was suggested
by Klluchevsky's description of the Russian experience in the XVI-XVTI
2/
centuries, but it aims at a wider applicability.—
According to Klluchevsky, from about the second half of the
XV century Russia was engaged in long hard wars against her western
and southern neighbors. The wars required large forces that the
state found impossible to support from tax revenue alone. Hence the
government began to assign lands (pomes t 'la) to the servitors, who
were expected to use peasant labor (directly and/or via payments in
kind and/or money) for their maintenance and xjeapons. In exchange,
the servitor gave the peasants a loan and permitted them, free men
as yet, to work all or part of his land on their own. The system
worked rather badlv, however, because of shortage of labor. Severe
competition among landowners developed, the servitors being bested by
lay and clerical magnates. Things became particularly difficult for
the servitors after the middle of the XVI century when the central
areas of the state became depopulated because of peasant migration
Into the newly conquered areas in the east and southeast. Under the
pressure of the serving class and for certain other reasons, the
government gradually restricted the freedom of peasants, already
hopelessly In debt to their landlords, to move. They became enserfed
by the middle of the XVII century, though the process Itself continued
for many decades to come.
This Is a very rough summary of Kliuchevsky's story which hardly
does him iustice but which will serve my purposes until Part II.
Like many a historian, he assembled and described the relevant facts
(and in beautiful Russian at that) and stopped jiist short of an
analytical explanation.
The economist would recast Kliuchevsky's account as follows:
The servitors tried to live off rents (in one form or another) to
be collected from their estates. But the estates could not yield
a significant amount of rent for the simple reason that land in
Russia was not sufficiently scarce relative to labor, and ironically,
was made even less scarce by Russian conquests. The scarce factor
of production was not land but labor. Hence it was the ownership
of peasants and not of land that could yield an income to the
servitors or to any non-working landOT^ming class.
A simple economic model may sharpen the argument (if any sharp-
ening is needed) and help to develop it further. Assume that labor
and land are the only factors of production (no capital or management)
,
and that land of uniform quality and location is ubiquitous. No
diminishing returns in the application of labor to land appear; both
the average and the marginal productivities of labor are constant
and equal, and if competition among employers raises wages to that
level (as would be expected), no rent from land can arise, as
Rlcardo demonstrated some time past. In the absence of specific
governmental action to the contrary (see below) , the country will
consist of family-size farms because hired labor, In any form, will
be either unavailable or unprofitable: the wage of a hired man
or the Income of a tenant will have to be at least equal to what
he can make on his oim farm; if he receives that much, no surplus
(rent) will be left for his employer. A non-working class of
servitors or others could be supported by the government out of
taxes levied (directly or indirectly) on the peasants, but it
could not support Itself from land rents.
As a step toward reality, let us relax the assumption of the
ubiquity of uniform land, and let capital (clearing costs, food,
seeds, livestock, structures and implements) and management be
included among the factors of production. Ovmers of capital, of
superior skill and of better-than-average land will now be able to
pay a hired man his due (or to use a tenant) and still obtain a
surplus. But so long as agricultural skills can be easily acquired,
the amount of capital for starting a farm is small, and the per-
caplta income is relatively high (because of the ample supply of
land) , a good worker should be able to save or borrow and start on
his own in time. Most of the farms will still be more or less
family-size, with an estate using hired labor (or tenants) here and
there in areas of unusually good (In fertility and/or in location)
land, or specializing in activities requiring hlgher-than-average
capital intensity, or skillful management. But until land becomes
rather scarce, and/or the amount of capital required to start a farm
relatively large, it is unlikely that a large class of landowners.
such as required by the Muscovite government, could be supported by
economic forces alone. The American North In the Colonial period
and in the XIX century would be a good example of an agricultural
structure of this type.
So far the institutional structure has been shaped by economic
3/forces alone without direct Interference by the government.— Suppose
now that the government decides to create, or at least to facilitate
the creation, of a non-working class of agricultural owners. As
a first step, it gives the members of this class the sole right of
ownership of land. The peasants will now have to work for the
landowners, but so long as the workers are free to move, competition
among the employers will drive the wage up to the value of the
marginal product of labor, and since the latter is still fairly
close to the value of the average product (because of the abundance
of land) little surplus will remain. The Rtissian situation prior
to the peasants' enserfment corresponds to this case.
The next and final step to be taken by the government still
pursuing its objective is the abolition of the peasants' right to
move. With labor tied to land or to the owner, competition among
employers ceases. Nov; the employer can derive a rent, not from his
land, but from his peasants by appropriating all or most of their
4/
Income above some subsistence level.— That Russian serfs could
stay alive, and even to multiply, while working for themselves
half-time and less suggests that the productivity of their labor
(with poor technique, little capital, but abundant land) must have
been quite high.
To recapitulate, the strong version of this hypothesis (without
capital, management, etc.) asserts that of the three elements of an
agricultural structure relevant here — free land, free peasants and
non-working landowners — any two elements but never all three can
exist simultaneously . The combination to be found in reality will
depend on the behavior of political factors — governmental measures —
treated here as an exogenous variable.
The presence of this exogenous political variable seriously
weakens the effectiveness of my model: it makes the presence of
free land by itself neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for the existence of serfdom. It is not a necessary condition
because so long as marginal productivity of labor is high, serfdom
may continue to exist even if free land is no longer present; it
may even be imposed at this stage, as it was in the Russian ITcraine
in the XVIIl century. Free land is not a sufficient condition because,
as I stated above, without proper governmental action free land will
give rise to free farmers rather than to serfs.
For the same reasons the model cannot predict the net effect
of a change in the land/labor ratio on the position of the peasants.
Runpose, that with constant land, technology and per-caplta stock
of capital, population increases. The economic position of the
peasants will x^7orsen (even serfs can be exploited more) , but the
landowners will be less inclined to Interfere with the peasants'
freedom. Let population decline instead. The peasants will be
better off provided they do not become less free. Thus a change in
the land/labor ratio can set in motion economic and political forces
acting in opposite directions.
The strength and usefulness of the model could be increased by
making the political variable endogenous. But this I cannot do
without help from historians and political scientists.
These difficulties noti^rithstanding, I would still expect to find
a positive statistical correlation between free land and serfdom
(or slavery). Such a correlation was indeed found by H. J. Nieboer
of whom you'll hear more in Part III.
What about the end of serfdom (or slavery)? Traditionally
it was assumed that it would or did disappear because of the inherent
superiority of free labor. This superiority, arising from the higher
motivation of the free man, was supposed to increase with greater
use of capital and xjith technological progress. Let us disregard
the possibly greater reliability of the slave and the longer hours
he may be forced to work (particularly in traditional societies where
leisure is highly valued), and let us assume that the economy has
reached the position where the net average productivity of the
free worker (Pf) is considerably larger than that of a slave (Pg)
•
The abolition of slavery is clearly in the national interest (unless
the immediate military considerations, such as of the Muscovite
government, overwhelm the economic ones), but not necessarily in the
interest of an Individual slave owner motivated by his profit and
not by patriotic sentiment. He will calculate the difference between
the wage of a free worker (Wf) and the cost of subsistence of a
slave (Wcj) and will refuse to free his slaves unless Pf - Pg > Wf - Wg ,
all this on the assumption that either kind of labor can be used In
a given field.—
As the economy continues to develop, the difference ?f - Pg
can be expected to widen. Unfortunately, the same forces —
technolop.lcal progress and capital accumulation — responsible for
this effect are apt to Increase W^ as well, while Wg need not
change. We cannot tell on a priori grounds whether Pf - Pg will
Increase more or less than Wf - W^ . Therefore we cannot be sure
that technological progress and greater use of capital necessarily
reduce the profitability of slave as compared with free labor. Much
will depend on the nature of technological progress. Thus Eli
Whitney's gin greatly increased the profitability of slavery, while
a transition from raising crops to breeding sheep in medieval England
might have acted in the opposite direction by creating a surplus
of workers. (See Part II). American planters must have used better
agricultural techniques and more capital than their Latin-American
and particularly Russian colleagues, but the Americans defended
slavery with much greater zeal.
In a traditional society without technological progress and
capital accumulation, the end of slavery is, paradoxically, more
certain. As population continues to increase and the society
eventually becomes Malthusian, the marginal product of labor
descends to the subsistence level. Now the free man costs little
more to employ than the slave, while, hopefully, being less
bothersome and more productive. The oi^nership of human beings
becomes pointless because of the great multiplication of slaves, and
they become free provided they stay poor.— It is land that becomes
valuable, and rents collected from estates worked by free laborers
or tenants without any non-economic compulsion are sufficient to
support an army of servitors or idlers. If the Muscovite government
could have only waited a few hundred years I
II
Where I come from, an economic model without empirical testing
is equated with a detective story without an end. My attempts to
test the present model, however, merely taught me that the job is
not for the amateur. I shall report to you the results of my skin-
deep investigation in the hope that my mistakes will stimulate the
specialists. I concentrate on the Russian case, with short excursions
into the histories of Poland-Lithuania, Western Europe and the
United States.
1. Russia . The phenomenon to be explained here is not only the
development of serfdom but its particular timing: before 1550
Russian peasants were free men; a hundred years later they were
serfs. The relevant variables are:
(1) the number of servitors required by the military needs of
the Moscow state, and (2) the population density.
According to Kliuchevsky, prior to the middle of the XV century,
Moscow, still a Tatar vassal surrounded by other Russian lands,
fought very few foreign wars; its population became dense because
Moscow was the safest spot in the area with few outlets for
erolpiratlon.— Ue may conclude that there was no need as yet for a
larp:e class of servitors, and that the landoTvmers could derive rents
fron their estates (patrimonies, to be exact) without enserflnp the
peasants. It Is true that Russia, from the Kievan times onward,
always had a substantial number of slaves. At the time, these were
3/
mostly household servants and retainers rather than peasants.—
From the middle of the X^7 century the situation changes
drastically. Havlnp become Independent from the Tatars (officially
In 1480, actually earlier), and having gathered a number of Russian
lands, Moscow was confronted with powerful enemies: with Poland-
Lithuania and Sweden In the west and northwest, and with the
Crimean Tatars In the south. The struggle with the latter went on
continuously, while 50 years out of the 103 In 14P2-1595 were
spent In wars against Poland-T,lthuanla and Sweden, as were the
following 30 years out of 70 In 1613-1682, not to mention the
9/
Time of Troubles, 1598-1613, filled with both civil and foreign wars.—
The military proficiency of the >fuscovlte armies being poor,
refuge was sought In large numbers. More than 300,000 men were
reported to be under arms during Tvan the Terrible 's Llvonlan Var.
There must have been a great Increase In the number of servitors.
T'lth trade and Industrv maMng no significant progress, the government
had to assign land to them. This process began on a large scale In
the second half of the XV century and was accelerated throughout
the XVI century.—
In the meantime, the central areas of the country became depop-
ulated. The conquest of the whole expanse of the Volga river (began
10
In 1552) opened up vast areas of better soil and attracted large
masses of peasants fleeing from high taxes, Ivan the Terrible 's
onpression (the famous oprichnina) and Crimean invasions. And
then came the Time of Troubles which devastated the country once
more. Already in the XVT century there was fierce competition for
peasant hands among the landowners. It must have intensified after
1613.ii/
Thus both ingredients for the development of serfdom — a high
land/labor ratio and the government's determination to create a
large class of servitors — were present. In addition, there were
several other forces working in the same direction. The first was
the decline in the power of the great magnates, both at the hands
of Ivan the Terrible and during the "^ime of Troubles. By offering
the peasants privileges and protection, these m.agnates had been
quite successful in bidding the peasants away from the servitors;
for this reason the magnates favored the free movement of peasants,
while the servitors, oulte naturally, opposed it. Now the peasants
12/lost the support of their "friends."— The second reason lay in
the fiscal interest of the state: peasant migrations, particularly
from the center to the periphery of the state, disorganized tax
13/
collections.— And flnallv, the peasant communities objected to
the emigration of their members because the community carried a
collective responsibility for the tax liabilities of its members
(until in later years this responsibility was taken over by the
masters) : the departure of several members would leave the rest
overburdened until the next census.
—
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Space does not allow me to pive additional details of the
process which gradually enserfed the peasants, or to discuss the
disagreement between Klluchevsky who emphasized the hopeless
indebtedness of the peasants to their landlords as the main obstacle
to their movement, and Grekov and Rlum who put greater stress on
legislative enactments (particularly on the so-called "Forbidden
Years" (zapovednye gody ) .— Let me mention instead two further
reflections of the scarcity of labor in Russia: the first
manifested itself in the replacement of the basic land tax by a
household tax in the XVTT centurv, and by a poll tax under Peter the
Great.— "Hit? second is an interesting cultural trait which remained
long after its cause had probably disappeared: as late as in the
first half of the XIX century, the social position of a Tlussian
landoT^mer, as described in contemnorarv literature, depended less
on the size of his land holdings (which are seldom mentioned) than
on the number of souls (registered male peasants) that he owned.
—
2. Poland-Lithuania . On frie theory that the length of a report
should be proportional to the intensity of research done, this
section will be very short. The relevant facts are as follows:
(1) In the XTV century vast open and very sparcely populated
IR/
territories in the llcraine were conquered by the Lithuanians.—
(2) In the XV and XVI centuries, Ukraine was repopulated by
immigrants from the more central areas of the state. The migration
depopulated the central areas to such an extent as to constitute,
19/
according to Crekov, a threat to the Polish state.
—
12
20/
(3) By the end of the XVI centurv, the peasants wero enserfed.
—
K'hat is not clear to me Is the time sequence of events
(2) and (3). In Vol. Til (p. 110), Klfuchevsky dates the repopulation
of the Ukraine in the XVI century; in Vol. I (p. 293) — in the
XV century. But in both places he attributes the migration of peasants
to the intensification of serfdon in Poland-Lithuania. Polish serf-
dom, according to him, had been established already in the XIV
21/
century, and Lithuanian — in the XV century.— On the other hand,
Grekov asserts that according to the Polish constitution of 1493,
each peasant could still leave the land, havin)> settled accounts
with his landlord. But he also reports that in 1A44 the Galiclan
gentry demanded that the governm.ent prevent other landlords from
interfering with the peasant movements.— Evidently, such
interference was takinp, place even then.
In Poland-Lithuania preat paps between legal enactments and the
actual state of affairs were quite possible . There were probably
considerable regional variations, both in law and in practice as
well. I would be happier if it could be established that migration
to the ITkraine preceded the development of serfdom, but I am certainly
not in a position to settle the matter. It is quite possible that
migration and serfdom were reinforcing each other.
Since I have not studied the development of serfdom in other
East European countries, I can make only two brief comments on
Blum's well-known and very interesting article on "The Rise of
Serfdom in Eastern Europe." His stress on the increasing power of
the nobility and on the general depopulation of the area "from the
13
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Elbe all the way across to the Volpa..." Is heartily welcome.
—
Rut his use of alternating periods of prosperity and depression
as Important causes of the rise and decline of serfdom cannot be
evaluated until he presents an analytical explanation of the
causation involved.
3. Western Europe . We shall deal here very briefly with four
events
:
(1) The emergence of serfdom in the late Roman Empire
(2) The decline of serfdom by 1300
(3) Its non-recurrence after the Rlack Death
(4) The relationship between sheep breeding and serfdom.
The depoptilation of the late Roman Empire is, of course, well
known. Referring to Bysantium, Reorg Ostrogorsky states:
And so ever-increasing masses of the rural
population were tied to the soil. This is a
particular instance of the widespread compulsory
fastening of the population to their occupation
which scarcity of labour forced the later Roman
24/
Empire to pursue systematically.
—
This is the clearest statement on the relation between scarcity
of labor and the development of serfdom that I have come across in
my reading of European economic history.
Similarly, the great increase in population in Western Europe
by the end of the XIII century when serfdom was declining is also
well known. Thus Ganshof and ^'erhulst talk about "... a considerable
and growing reserve of surplus labor ..." in France, and Postan
udiscusses sl^ns of overpopulation In England: a growing number
of wholly landless men, sub-holdings of many tenants, shortage of
25/pasture, etc.— The same Information for Western Europe In
general Is svipplled by Smith, who adds that:
The problem therefore for western landox-mers
,
at any rate before the demographic collapse of
the mid-fourteenth century, was not to keep
26/tenants, but hor^ to get the most out of them.
—
Since these facts fit my hypothesis so nicely, let me stop here
while T am still winning.
Rut when we come to the depopulation caused by the Black Death
after 1348 (though, according to Postan, English population stopped
27/growing even earlier) ,— my hypothesis Is of little value In
explaining the subsequent course of events. (See Part I). Why
did serfdom fall to come back after such a sharp Increase In the
land/labor ratio?
I address myself only to England. Except for a rather queer
one to be discussed presently, I have no economic explanations to
offer and have to fall back on political factors. Serfdom could not
be restored unless the landowners were reasonably united In their
pressure on the government, and unless the latter was willing and
able to do their bidding. Rut It Is most unlikely that every
estate lost the same percentage of Its peasants. Hence, those
landowners who had suffered most would welcome the freedom of
peasant movement, at least for a while, while those who had suffered
least v;ould oppose It. If so, the landowners could not be united.
15
Postan snpgests the probability that the main pressure behind
Richard TI's legislation came not from feudal landowners, but from
smaller men;— Enpllsh magnates, like their Russian colleapues
(see above) ,could evidently take care of their own interests.
Though I cannot judge the "spirit" of medieval legislation. It
seems to me that the measures undertaken by Richard's government
29/
were somewhat halfhearted.— In any case, they were ineffective.
So economic forces could reassert themselves and help the peasants.
have
The queer economic explanation which I just mentioned would
delight an economist If only it squared with facts. Tt is the
expansion of sheep breeding, an activity which is land-using and
30/labor saving.— Unfortunately such data as I could find do not
support the contention that there was an expansion of sheep
breeding in the hundred years following the Black Death. The
legal exports of English wool, in raw and in cloth, fell from 12
million pounds in 1350 to 8.7 million in 1400 — a drop of 27 per
cent. Another fall of 12 per cent (of the 8.7 million) took place
31/by 1450.— t'fy authorities do not state the proportions of wool
32/
consumed at home and smuggled out of the country.— Perhaps
these were affected by the Hundred Years War. Rut as things
stand, T certainly cannot claim that an expansion of English
sheep breeding took place after 1350 and that it helped to save
33/
the peasants from the return of serfdom.
—
Judging by Thomas More's famous passage about sheep devouring
men, by Bishop Latimer's "Sermon of the Plough" (1549), and by
other more direct evidence, there must have been considerable
16
expansion of sheep breeding at the expense of crops and of people
34/
In the XVI centurv.— By that time, however, English peasants
hardly needed the help from the sheep to stay free.
But Is It possible that the early expansion of sheep breeding
which must have taken place sometime prior to 1350 had helped
the English serfs to gain their freedom after all?
A. The United States . The American South, fits my hypothesis
with such embarrassing simplicity as to question the need for It.
The presence of vast expanses of empty fertile land In a warm
climate, land capable of producing valuable products If only
labor could be found seems to me quite sufficient to explain the
Importation of slaves. TJhat Is not clear to me Is the failure of
the North to use them In large numbers. Besides social and
political objections, there must have been economic reasons why
Negro slaves had a comparative advantage. In the South as compared
with the North. Perhaps It had something to do with the superior
adaptability of the Negro to a hot climate, and /or with his
usefulness In the South almost throughout the year rather than for
35/
the few months In the North.— I have a hard time believing that
slaves could not be used in the mixed farming of the North: much
food was produced on southern farms, most of the slave owners had
3fi /
very few slaves, and many slaves were skilled in crafts.— A
study of the possible profitability of slavery in the North, along
Conrad and ^"fever's lines, which could show whether the North
could have afforded paying the market price for slaves, would be
most welcome.
17
I have not coroe across any pood evidence that slavery
was dyin^ out in the United States on the eve of the Civil t'ar,
and I side here with Conrad and Meyer, though, in truth, I
am not sure that such a thorough investigation was required to
37/prove the profitability of slavery in the South.
—
TIT
In conclusion, let me say a few words about the origin of
my hypothesis and about its place in economic history. Although
I had discussed it in my classes for a f»ood dozen years, I did not
write it up until 1966 because I had been told on pood authority
that the idea was old and well known. My source was Indeed correct
because a brief search in the library revealed quite a few predecessors,
The most important of them was the Dutch scholar Herman J. Nieboer
whose magnum onus of A65 pages under the title of Slavery as an
38/
Industrial System; Ethnological Researches was published In 1900.
—
The hypothesis which I have immodestly called "mine" is stated by
him time and again, and tested against a mass of anthropological and
historical data. As you might expect, he was satisfied xi^ith his
results.
But the hypothesis was not really original with Nieboer. He
traced it back to A. Loria's Les Bases Economlques de la Constitution
Soclale of 1893, and to E. C, Wakefield's A View of the Art of
Coloni;;atlon published in 1834. Some glimpses can be found even in
39/
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations .^^
I have two disagreements with Nieboer. First, his definition
of free land has too much legal and not enough economic content to
18
my taste, though he seems to have been unclear rather than wrong.
Second, he exaggerated the Importance of the hypothesis by claiming,
though not in so many words, that free land or other free resources
are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of slavery or
serfdom: "... Only among neople with open resources can slavery
and serfdom exist, whereas free labourers dependent on wages are only
40/found among people with close resources."— He protected himself
with a note on the same page by excluding simple societies of hunters,
fishers and hunting agriculturists, hardly a fit company for the
farmers of the American North. He disregarded the possibility that
serfdom, once established, could exist for a long time after its initial
cause — free land — had disappeared, or that serfdom may be even
introduced In the absence of free land. He Ignored the role of
government
.
These, however, are minor defects in an important contribution.
On the other hand, my source may have been a bit wrong. If
historians have always knoim about the relation between the land/labor
ratio and serfdom (or slavery), they must have tried hard not to
scatter too many good, clear statements in places where I could find
them, though the students of the American South have been much
41/kinder to me than others.— Mieboer could also lodge some complaints.
His name can be found neither in the bibliography nor in the index of
the 1966 edition of the first volume of The Cambridge Economic History
of Europe
. And it is absent from Blum's classic study of Russian
serfdom. T did find Vieboer's name in Henovese's The Political
Economy of Slavery in connection with some insignificant point.
19
but x.7lth a further notation that "Phillips read and referred to this
book." Phillips had read it, and confirmed that "hired labor was
42/
not to be had so lonp as land was free."
—
Perhaps in history this hypothesis occupies a place similar
to that enjoyed by economic prowth in economic theory not long ago.
That place v;as once described as "always seen around but seldom
Invited in." If so, why not invite it? After all, the land/labor
ratio is readily quantifiable.
20
NOTES
1^1 For many helpful conments on an earlier draft, T am
grateful to the following persons: Abraham Becker, Oleg Hoeffdlng,
Clayton La Force, Edward ^'itchell, William Parker, George Rosen, Matthew Edel,
Peter Temin, Helen Turin and Charles Wolfe. Alexander Gerschenkron's
earlier suggestions were also verv helpful.
Thanks are also due to Ann Peet for her excellent research
assistance.
I am also grateful to the RAND Corporation for its support of
an earlier version of this study (Mo. D-15169, 20 October 1966),
and to the National Science Foundation for its assistance
(Grant No. NSF-GS-2627) in revising and extending the first draft.
Neither these two organizations, nor the persons listed above, are
responsible for the views expressed here.
2J V. Kliuchevsky, Kurs russkoi istorii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1937). The original work
was published in 1906. All my references apply to the 1937 edition.
An English translation by C. J. Hogarth, A History of Russia , was
published in New York by Russel and Russel in 1960. For specific
references, see Part II.
V I mean by the "government" any organization capable of
maintaining some measure of law and order and particularly of
using non-economic compulsion. It can be a king, an assembly of
landowners, a magnate, etc.
hj Ke may be restrained by custom and by the fear that his
serfs can run away — a common occurence in Russia.
5J Actually, it is not easy to compare the relative profit-
ability of free and slave labor. Since the free worker is paid
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more or less concurrently with his work, while a slave must be
either reared or purchased, and may have children, etc., the
streams of receipts and expenditures from the two kinds of labor
must be properly discounted. It Is assumed In the text that all
Indirect costs of uslnp slaves, such as medical expense, extra
suoervlsion, etc., are Included In Wg.
In a well-organized slave market, the price of a slave will
approximate the present value of his discounted net lifetime marginal
product. A buyer who pays this price will discover that he will
earn not much more than the goin^ rate of interest; he will complain
about the high cost of slaves and express doubt regarding the
profitability of slavery in general, because at the margin he will
be fairly indifferent between employing free or slave labor. But
so long as the supply of food and of similar items for the maintenance
of slaves is elastic (which it is likely to be) , the slave-breeder
should do very well. He benefits from the perpetual disequilibrium
in the slave market created by the abundance of land and by the
limited human capacity to procreate (assuming no importation of
slaves) . But if the slave-breeder computes his rate of return on
the current value of his slaves and land, he Tnay not record much
more than the market rate of Interest either. In other words, the
market mechanism transforms the profit from slaves into capital
gains.
Dn this see Lewis Cecil Cray, History of Agriculture in the
Southern United States to 1860
,
published in 1933 and reproduced in
part in Harold D. Woodman, Slavery and the Southern Economy; Sources
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and Readings (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966),
pp. 106-09, and Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, The Economics of
Slavery and Other Studies in Econometric History (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 196A) , pp. 43-92.
hj It is possible that even in a Malthusian society slavery
(or serfdom) may linger on. Slaves may be kept for reasons of
social prestige (a relic from the times when slavery was profitable)
,
or simply because a slave is m.ore reliable than a hired man.
On the other hand, the use of a tenant (with a limited lease)
or of a hired man allows the landoT-mer to choose the best among
several applicants with much <?reater ease than among slaves or
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